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Abstract
Facing a fragile financial situation, the Portuguese governments have been imple-
menting reforms to offset the increasing healthcare costs. Attempting to cut ex-
penses, a number of mergers between public hospitals were employed.
Using a fixed effects model and a differences-in-differences estimator, this thesis
analyses the effects of twelve mergers on the hospitals’ financial performance and
efficiency. The data set includes the years between 2004 and 2011.
The results suggest that, while these mergers caused the efficiency of the hospitals to
decrease, they are yet to produce effects on the institutions’ financial performance.
JEL classification: I11, I18, L32.
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Description of the variables
Total cost — TC: Total expenditure of a hospital institution, as declared in the
respective financial report.
Average length of stay — ALOS: Total days of hospital stay divided by the
number of inpatient episodes.
Case-mix index — CMI: Value that indicates the complexity of the hospital’s
inpatient episodes. The higher the index, the greater the complexity.
Day surgeries — DS: Surgical episodes with hospitalization inferior to 24 hours.
Emergencies — EM: Acute health problems that require immediate medical at-
tention.
Inpatient episodes — IE: A patient stay in a hospital superior to 24 hours.
Outpatient services — OS: Medical procedures or tests, with an hospital stay
under 24 hours.
Outpatient visits — OV: Patient visits to a hospital for treatment or diagnosis,
with a stay inferior to 24 hours.
Treat — Variable considering the hospitals that merge.
After — Variable that represents the years after the merger.
Aftertreat — Variable corresponding to the merged hospitals, in the years after
the merger .
EPE— Variable that controls for the implementation of the enterprise management
model in hospitals.
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cmi2 Squared case-mix index
lds Log of day surgeries
lds2 Squared log of day surgeries
lem Log of emergencies
lem_os Product of log of emergencies and log of outpatient services
lem2 Squared log of emergencies
lie Log of inpatient episodes
lie_cmi Product of log of inpatient episodes and case-mix index
lie_em Product of log of inpatient episodes and log of emergencies
lie_ov Product of log of inpatient episodes and log of outpatient visits
lie_os Product of log of inpatient episodes and log of outpatient services
lie2 Squared log of inpatient episodes
lov Log of outpatient visits
lov_ds Product of log of outpatient visits and log of day surgeries
lov_os Product of log of outpatient visits and log of outpatient services
lov2 Squared log of outpatient visits
los Log of outpatient services





The XXI century brought several challenges to the Portuguese economy. In the last
decade, the government budget deficit beat its records in 2005 and 2009, hitting
6,5% and 10,2% of GDP, respectively. Consequently, the state’s debt stock, which
entered the year 2000 at 53% of GDP, reached a peak of 88% by the end of the
decade, and another one by middle 2013, of nearly 127% of GDP. Unemployment,
one of the most affected macroeconomic aggregates, which started the decade at
4,2%, had more than doubled by the end 2010, to an almost 11% mark, reaching
16,4% in January 20131.
The graphs that follow show the evolution of the government’s health final con-
sumption expenditure, respectively, per capita and in percentage of GDP. There is a
consistent cost growth tendency during the first decade of the XXI century, express-
ing the increase of the state’s health burden, as figure 1.1 shows. Since 2000, the
state’s per capita health expenses, without considering investment, have increased
in about 22%. Figure 1.2 draws an equally troubling picture, with health costs in
relation to GDP increasing by fairly 15% during the decade. The growth in health
costs was not followed by significant changes in the performance of the Portuguese
economy, creating a critical situation for the state’s finances. Accordingly, merging
public hospitals was chosen as a way to reform the health sector.
1 Sources: Banco de Portugal: dívida directa do estado em percentagem do PIB; Banco de Por-




Figure 1.1.: Government health final consumption expenditure, per capita, in
euros











Notes: Constant Prices, base year 2012.
Sources: INE (2014) (Variable: Despesa corrente pública em saúde). INE,
Consumer Price Index (Índice de Preços no consumidor, base 2012.
Figure 1.2.: Government health final consumption expenditure, as percentage of
GDP
















Source: INE (2014) (Variable: Despesa corrente pública em saúde)
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1.2 Context and structure of the work
The first hospital merger laws appeared in Portugal in 1946 (Diário do Governo,
1968), with a small number of mergers happening until the end of the 90s. The
new century brought new economic challenges and with it, the changes in NHS’
organization, including a merger wave in the hospital sector. According to the
legislation, the objective of the mergers is, through the common management, to
share resources in a way that answers to the existing lacks of means, and to cut
costs. The common administration is also expected to create savings and economies
of scale, to bring a better and more homogeneous decision-making process and to
allow for better management of human resources . (Diário da República, 2004)
1.2. Context and structure of the work
In the framework of the Portuguese National Health Service, this thesis uses a sample
containing data from thirty hospitals, for the eight years between 2004 and 2011.
While the data set includes observational data, the conditions of a natural experi-
ment can be replicated, as two groups of hospitals can be identified and compared,
a treatment group—twelve hospitals that merged during the eight years observed
in the data set—and a control group—composed of eighteen hospitals that did not
merge during the considered timeline. The treatment group registers the changes
the mergers caused in the hospitals. Still, this does not reveal what would have
happened if the mergers had not taken place. That is the role of the control group,
to simulate what would have happened in the absence of the mergers. In other
words, comparing both groups it is possible to simulate an experiment where can
be observed what happened due to the mergers, which would not have happened
otherwise.
It would be ideal to study a random sample of hospitals. It is here assumed that the
choice of the treated hospitals was random, as the government chose the hospitals
that would merge. Nonetheless, we know this was not so, as the dimension, location,
among other features influenced the choice of the hospitals that merged, representing
a handicap of this study.
Improving the hospitals’ financial performance was a central objective of these mer-
gers. The expectation, thus, is that the mergers bring down the expenditure of the
institutions. Still, joining separately managed hospitals into a single management
may still cause the opposite effect as, for instance, increasing the institutions’ size
3
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may diminish the financial control. It is also possible that the mergers have no
influence on the financial performance of the involved hospitals. Therefore, the first
objective of this thesis is to find what happened to the hospital’s financial perform-
ance, measured by the hospitals’ total costs.
Additional, it makes sense to analyse if the efficiency of the hospitals changed, as a
result from the mergers. Did the common management brought efficiency gains? Or,
on the other hand, the bigger scale caused an efficiency decrease, or even no effect
at all? In accordance, the second objective of this research is to identify whether
the mergers caused any changes to the hospitals’ efficiency, measured by the average
length of stay, a classic physical efficiency measure. To sum up, this study’s research
question is: “Did the merged hospitals observe changes in the financial performance
or efficiency?”.
This research contributes to the current literature in several ways. Firstly, it provides
a different geographic standpoint, given that the majority of the research on hospital
mergers reflects the United States’ case, which is usually focused on prices—as
American hospitals are mostly supported by private health insurances. The present
analysis explores the Portuguese case, where, unlike the Unites States, there is a
greater prevalence of public hospitals and public health insurance (see section 1.3.2).
Secondly, it attempts to provide some evidence on the effects of the Portuguese
public hospital merger policy, and get answers as to if this strategy is returning the
expected results.
The study is organized in seven chapters. The second chapter defines the experiment,
followed by third chapter, which describes the construction of the sample and shows
descriptive statistics. The fourth chapter describes the methodology used in the
analysis of the data, while the results are presented in the fifth chapter. Chapter
six develops a robustness analysis of the results and chapter seven presents the




1.3.1. Reasons for merging
The main motivations behind hospital mergers are economic. For starters, these
motives are the cost savings originated by the cut of duplicated services and the
improvements in management and production processes. Additionally, merged hos-
pitals benefit from better access to capital, as well as quality improvements from
higher volumes of specialized procedures. These mergers are also believed to promote
better allocation of resources and personnel, generating better geographic coverage
and better use of human resources, reducing idle staff, for instance. (Connor et al.,
1997)2
Menke (1997) proposes that merged hospitals may face lower costs, since they can
jointly acquire and share inputs, in addition to having an higher likelihood of access-
ing lower interest rates of capital. On the other hand, Garside (1999) suggests that
hospital mergers induce cost efficiency at the production level through economies of
scale and scope, and represent a way of dealing with excess capacity.
Luft et al. (1987) suggests that for hospitals, being part of a bigger group that
attracts more patients, will help create doctors with better skills. Finally, merging
creates a bigger market power for the involved institutions, allowing them a bigger
bargaining power whenever negotiating with private insurers. In return, due to the
added negotiating capacity, higher prices will probably be charged, according to
Tenn (2011)3.
1.3.2. Evidence on mergers in the hospital industry
In the literature concerning hospital mergers, the most commonly studied indicators
are prices and costs, and some authors analyse them together. The interest in
analysing prices or costs depends on the hospital’s financing scheme. In the United
States it is more interesting to study prices because the system mostly functions on a
2 Although this paper names these reasons for merging, the causal effect could go in the oppos-
ite direction. In other words, hospitals that have these characteristics can represent better
candidates to mergers.
3 This is a motive to merge that does not apply to the Portuguese case. Prices and the negotiation




price basis4, due to an enormous prevalence of private health insurances. In contrast,
in Portugal it makes sense to analyse costs, since the Portuguese NHS’ hospitals are
state financed, through a contract program. The Ministry of Health pays for major
production categories, such as inpatient episodes, using a Diagnostic Related Groups
measure to adjust prices—the government determines prices unilaterally. (Valente,
2010)
Controlling and reducing costs was a central objective of the Portuguese public
hospitals mergers. In accordance, relevant studies on the impact of mergers on
hospital costs are now presented5. Coyne (1982) investigated the effects of hospital
mergers on costs and productivity and observed an increase in both indicators.
The study registered, however, an exception for county hospitals, which showed a
decrease in costs and no relevant productivity changes. Sinay (1998), another study
focusing on costs, found evidence of a fall in expenditure. The author states that
there appeared to be gains due to economies of scale and scope and adds that the
observed merged hospitals suffered from diseconomies of scale prior to the merger.
Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) executed a similar analysis. This study sustains that
mergers do not generate savings on a consistent basis. Additionally, the authors
affirm that significant savings existed after three or four years only for the case
where there was closure or transformation of one of the facilities. Spang et al.
(2001), studying the merger impact on hospital costs and prices, concluded that the
effects vary with markets and hospital conditions.
Under circumstances closer to this thesis’, Gaynor et al. (2012) studied a wave of
hospital mergers in the English NHS between 1997 and 2006. These mergers implied
hospital closure, leading to the disappearance of one quarter of the NHS’ hospitals.
Using a matching technique to compare the performance of the merged hospitals
with those which did not merge, the study analysed the changes in two sets of
outcome variables. The first set corresponds to activity, including indicators such
as financial performance, staffing and labour productivity. The second indicator
set, considers variables such as waiting times and a set of clinical outcomes that
measure the performance of English hospitals. This analysis found little gains in
merging, as it discovered a decrease in activity, through the reduction of admissions
and staff, poorer financial performance and unchanged labour productivity. While
4 In the United States, insurance companies pay hospitals on a per-diem or fee-for-service schemes.
Insurance companies and hospitals negotiate the fees annually and the bargaining power of each
part is decisive.
5 The mentioned articles analyse large samples of hospitals.
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most quality measures showed no change, waiting times rose.
The literature that analyses the effects of hospital mergers on costs did not offer
consistent conclusions. Although the results it presents are rather ambiguous, the
different studies seem to offer more evidence against merging, than in favour of it.
Some authors6 suggest these divergences may happen due to the different conditions
proportioned by the geographical location, the market in which these institutions
operated and the specific conditions that the hospitals were subject to.
6 See Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) and Spang et al. (2001).
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2. Design of the experiment
In order to estimate the effect of the mergers, it is not enough to observe what
happened to the treated hospitals before and after the introduction of the treat-
ment. Imagining an experiment with mice, in which these animals are being treated
against a particular disease, just observing the reaction of the mice to the medicine—
comparing their health before and after the treatment—does not control for over
time changes not related with the treatment. For instance, it does not control for
the fact that these mice could have simply healed on their own, nor does it con-
sider the chance of an environmental factor helping the mice heal, or even that the
sample includes the most healthy and disease-resistant mice, instead of being ran-
domly chosen. The solution is to include a counterfactual group in the analysis,
which is not exposed to the treatment. Nonetheless, it is not sufficient to study
one time period. Using the example, just comparing the treated with the untreated
mice, in the period after the introduction of the medicine still does not take into
account unmeasured differences between the two groups of animals, which might in-
fluence the results. However, comparing both groups in the periods before and after
the treatment, allows the observation of the disease response of mice that undergone
treatment and compare it to that of the animals that did not take the medicine. In
other words, the control group allows the observation of what would have happened
to the treated mice, if they had not been treated. The situation of the present study
is the same, there is a treatment group consisting of hospitals that merged, and a
control group composed by hospitals that did not merge.
2.1. Data set restrictions
Only NHS’ hospitals with publicly available data are considered. Unless they are
involved in a merger, specialized institutions such as maternities, medical centres, or
psychiatric, oncology, orthopaedic or children’s hospitals are not considered, given
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that these institutions have different cost functions. Hospitals under Public Private
Partnership schemes generally do not make their data public, and therefore are not
included in the sample.
Local Health Units—Unidades Locais de Saúde, in other words, a merger between
hospitals and clinics—typically do not discriminate between hospital and clinic fin-
ancial information, nor do non-merged clinics publish this information. Thus, a
before-after comparison cannot be done, because it is not possible to add up the
clinics’ data to the hospitals’ in the before period, nor is it possible to remove this
data from the merged institutions, in the after period. For these reasons, Local
Health Units are not considered, nor do the hospitals that integrate one.
2.2. Identification
This study compares a treatment group with a control group, during two stages, the
period before and the period after the merger. All the hospitals considered in both
groups were selected for they meet the criteria presented in the previous section.
The variables that compose the experiment are presented as follows.
2.2.1. Treatment group
The treatment group includes the hospitals that are involved in a merger, in other
words, hospitals that are subject to the treatment. The mergers happen in different
years and the treated hospitals are always considered in the treatment group. The
challenge was that, before the merger, merged hospitals exist as two, or more, sep-
arated institutions, producing separated data. Therefore, the data of independent
hospitals that eventually merge was consolidated7 into a single entity during the
period before the merger, appearing as one single hospital throughout the data set’s
timeline.
This group is composed by twelve hospitals that merge between 2005 and 2010,
assuring that, for all treated hospitals, there is in the sample at least one year
7 The indicators were added up, for instance, for Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Norte. For this hospital,
before 2008, the total costs of Hospital Santa Maria and Hospital Pulido Valente were summed
up annually. For the indicators that assume the form of an average or index, such as the average
length of stay, for each given year, a mean of the hospitals for was computed.
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before and one year after the merger8. Although no such restriction was made, all
the treated hospitals only merge once in the data set.
2.2.2. Control group
The control group is formed by 18 hospitals that did not merge during the years
considered in the data set. Control group hospitals are considered in this group
during all the years observed in the sample.
2.2.3. Before and after periods
For each treat and control group hospital, there is a period before the merger—or the
treatment—moment, and a period after the treatment happens. In the treatment
group these periods are defined according to the hospitals’ merger date. A treated
hospital is in the before period until the year the merger happens (exclusive). From
that year on, the treated hospital is considered to be in the after period (inclusive).
Years in the after period are identified by the after variable.
This study considers a merger to take place in the year the law approved it, if it
happened in the first three months of the year. If otherwise, the approval took place
in the last three months, the merger is considered to have happened in the following
year. None of the analysed mergers was approved outside of the first or last three
months of the year.
For the control group, the before and after periods do not exist because these hos-
pitals do not merge. In order to create a before and after period for these hospitals,
the following method was applied. For each of the thirty hospitals, data about the
number of available beds was collected—the number of beds is indicator of hospital
dimension. Then the number of beds in the control group’s hospitals was compared
to that of the treatment group’s hospitals. Finally, the control group hospitals were
given the same after variable as the treatment group hospital with the most similar
8 This study requires the data set to have information, for every treated hospital, of at least one
year before merging and one year after merging, in order to be able to assess the effects of the
treatment. Therefore, mergers that happened in the first or last year of the sample’s timeline—
2004 or 2011—are not taken into account. There is one hospital that merges in 2004, Centro
Hospitalar do Barlavento Algarvio, and several that merge in 2011, such as Centro Hospitalar
de São João. All these hospitals were considered in the control group.
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number of beds—these control group hospitals behave the same way regarding the
before and after periods as its pair in the treatment group.














Notes: This table shows the hospitals that merged considered in the sample.
H refers to hospital, and CH refers to hospital center (centro hospitalar).
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CH Cova da Beira
CH Médio Tejo





H Garcia de Orta
H Infante D. Pedro
H Litoral Alentejano





H Universidade de Coimbra
Notes: This table shows the sample’s hospitals that did not merge.
H refers to hospital, and CH refers to hospital center (centro hospitalar).
Table 2.3.: Non-selected hospitals
Other hospitals
H Arcebispo João Crisóstomo
H Cândido de Figueiredo
H Distrital de Águeda
H Distrital de Pombal
H Dr. Francisco Zagalo
H Joaquim Urbano
H José Luciano de Castro
H Nossa Senhora da Conceição
H Professor Doutor Fernando Fonseca
CH do Oeste Norte
CH de Torres Vedras
H Visconde de Salreu
Notes: This table includes the hospitals that met the criteria explained in
section 2.1, but were not included in the sample due to lack of public data.
H refers to hospital, and CH refers to hospital center (centro hospitalar).
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The sample was built using the information available in the financial reports of
each of the analysed institutions, and in the cases in which the report was not
available the NHS’ financial reports9 were used. The data set is an unbalanced panel,
as occasionally there were hospitals that did not publish some data. It contains
observations for the following indicators: total costs10 (in constant prices of 2012,
in thousands of euros), average length of stay (in days), and number of inpatient
episodes, outpatient visits, outpatient services, emergencies and day surgeries, as
well as a case-mix index11. The data set includes observations within the eight-
year period of 2004 to 201112. The variables treat, after and aftertreat were added,
as explained in chapter 2. It was also added the variable enterprise management
model, which controls for the organizational change in Portuguese hospitals, which
happened to all the institutions in the data set.
The variables total costs, inpatient episodes, outpatient episodes, outpatient vis-
its, outpatient services, emergencies and day surgeries were transformed into logar-
ithms13. The average length of stay and the case-mix index were not transformed,
for a more interesting interpretation of results. Lastly, interaction effects and non-
linear effects were added. These effects were attained by multiplying all production
variables against all production variables.
9 The NHS’ financial reports include financial information for some of the NHS’ hospitals. The
used data set uses some information from the reports published between 2004 and 2008.
10 Total costs are presented in constant prices, base year 2012, computed using the INE Consumer
Price Index.
11 Some institutions did not divulge their case-mix index for some years. This happen in two
forms: either they only publish it after a given year or, contrariwise, they stop publishing it
after a given year. For the first case, the case-mix index in the previous years was assumed
to be constant and equal to the first value available. For the second case, the index for the
following years was assumed to remain constant and equal to the last value available.
12 The time range was chosen to cover as many mergers possible, given the limited data availability.
13 Given that there are zero and blank observations, the transformations into logarithms followed





Figure 3.1.: Mean of total costs










Notes: Constant prices, base 2012. Computed using INE
Consumer Price Index.
Values in hundreds of millions of euros.
For instance, 1,2 means 120.000.000€.
Total cost is the study’s main indicator, as the hospital mergers are expected to
reduce health costs. The data tells us that, through a generally constant upward
trend, the cost of the examined hospitals increased 7,4% between 2004 and 2010,
around 1,2% per year, on average. The mean of total costs for the sample is around
147 million euros.
The treatment group showed a cost growth pattern very similar to the average of
all hospitals, with the biggest difference being a more pronounced expenditure fall
14 The graphs often show a disparity between 2011 and the other years. This happens given that,
for 2011, there is only data available for 20 hospitals (instead of 30), which may influence the
means. For this reason, the change rates and averages discussed in the text correspond only to
the 2004-2010 period. This issue is discussed with further detail in chapter 6.
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between 2005 and 2008. Moreover, on average, this group appeared to be quite more
costly than the control group. For instance, whereas in no year the treatment group
registered an average total cost under one 180 million euros, this value was never
reached neither by the control group, nor by the whole sample.
Finally, as expected, the control group presented a more solid cost increase tendency
along the years, and it showed no more than a shy expenditure decrease in 2007. The
group assumed a global rate of change of 10% between 2004 and 2010, a superior
figure than the treatment group’s 6% (approximately).
15
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3.1.2. Average length of stay
Figure 3.2.: Mean of the average length of stay










Note: Values in days.
The data shows that, although the average length of stay did not suffer great changes
along time, the sample observed a rising trend along time, translating into an effi-
ciency downward trend. For the used sample, the average number of hospitalization
days was about 7,36 days.
The treatment group is more efficient than the sample’s average, for all years. There
seems to be a structure break in 2007, when this group’s average length of stay
suffered a spike. This will not be a problem in the analysis, as the time variables
will control for this effect. Generally, during the rest of the period, there was a rise
in the average number of stay days.
Contrariwise, the control group assumed a steadier tendency along the years. Its





Figure 3.3.: Mean of inpatient episodes











Notes: Values in tens of thousands of episodes.
For instance, 1,5 means 15.000 episodes.
Observing the whole hospital sample, the mean of inpatient episodes demonstrated
a very sticky behaviour, averaging 21.603 episodes. Nonetheless, since 2004, the
number of episodes fell in about 2,65% until 2010, around 4% per year.
The treatment group assumed a bolder evolution compared with the other group. It
registers an increase in the number of episodes until the year 2006, when the trend
is inverted and a persistent fall in this indicator began, translating into a decrease
of about 5% from 2004 to 2010. Furthermore, the treatment group’s production is
reasonably higher than in the comparison group, by twenty thousand episodes, on
average.
The control group observed a rather shy and highly irregular evolution of inpatient




Figure 3.4.: Mean of outpatient visits












Notes: Values in hundreds of thousands of visits.
For example, 1,5 means 150.000 visits.
Outpatient visits is the biggest output of the analysed hospitals and grew consist-
ently between 2004 and 2010. It rose, on average, in more than fifty thousand visits,
for a global change rate of approximately 25%, with an average of 232.555 visits.
The treatment group is the biggest producer of this service, observing a more erratic
growth than the other group. Only in 2006 and 2009 there were observed reductions
in this production line, which contributed to the great increases in outpatient visits
these hospitals achieved, for a global rate of change around 17%. On the other hand,





Figure 3.5.: Mean of emergencies















Notes: Values in hundreds of thousands of emergencies.
As an example, 1,2 means 120.000 emergencies.
Emergencies are associated with sudden non-specific health problems that require
immediate attention. For that reason, it is without surprise that this indicator
remained quite constant along the years, with an average of 149.317 emergency
episodes. In fact, between 2004 and 2010 there was a slight decrease in the number
of episodes, which is less than 1%.
The group of the treated showed a more erratic behaviour than the sample, but
produced a bigger number of emergency episodes. These figures have a downward
trend, however, notwithstanding the small growth observed in the first two periods,
as well as the one in 2009. The global change rate for this group is approximately
-7%.
For the control group, the number of emergency episodes was clearly smaller than
the treatment group’s figures. Still, this group observed a rise in the number of
emergencies throughout the period, corresponding to a global growth of almost 7%,




Figure 3.6.: Mean of outpatient services












Notes: Values in tens of thousands of services.
Exemplifying, 2,5 means 25.000 services.
Outpatient services are a new type of production and are greatly linked with cancer
treatments. This line of production’s growth along time resembles an exponential
shape and it increased in approximately 30% globally. On average, the examined
hospitals produced 24.960 outpatient services, until 2010.
Curiously, the evolution of this production line for either group is quite different
from the sample’s. Outpatient services in the treatment group grew exponentially
until the year 2007, stabilizing thereafter. This corresponds to a global increase of
approximately 36%, turning this group into the heavier producer.
The control group’s production of outpatient services falls until 2007. Thereafter,
it enters a period of strong growth, only offset in 2010. corresponding to a global




Figure 3.7.: Mean of day surgeries












Note: Values in number of surgeries.
Day surgeries was another indicator that exhibited an exponentially shaped growth
along the timeline. This growth corresponds to a change rate of approximately
225%, which means that this production line more than doubled during the analysed
period, with an average of 4.379, until 2010.
The treatment group’s behaviour showed the same trend as the sample, with the dif-
ference that it observes greater values. It has a global change rate of approximately
248%, a bigger figure than the sample’s.
Likewise, the control group’s outpatient episodes evolution also has an exponential




The method used to estimate the treatment effect is the Differences-in-Differences
(DiD) estimator15. Chapter 2 showed it was not enough to compare the situation of
the treated hospitals before and after the treatment, and that a control group was
needed. For a given dependent variable, the DiD estimator separately calculates the
differences between the before and after periods for the treat and control groups,
computing then the difference of those differences.
The impact of the treatment on the hospitals’ total costs is estimated through equa-
tion 4.1. The mergers’ impact on the average length of stay is measured by equation
4.2. Both equations are based on a translog cost function, equation 4.1 includes
the hospitals’ outputs16 as regressors, while equation 4.2 considers the hospital pro-
duction related to the efficiency—inpatient episodes and the case-mix index. The
equations include the interaction effects and non-linear effects (see final paragraph
of chapter 3) of the respective regressors. Finally, the equations incorporate the
variables treat, after, aftertreat and epe17, in addition to eight time variables—that
take into account the effect of the years.
15 All econometric calculations were made with the software Stata.
16 Hospitals with higher production levels are also expected to be more costly and less efficient,
therefore the institutions’ outputs should be taken into account in the estimation.
17 Which controls for the adoption of the enterprise management model.
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Method
log tcit = αi + β2treatit + β2afterit + β3aftertreatit + β4epeit +
n∑
j=1









alosit = αi + β1treat+ β2afterit + β3aftertreatit + β4epeit +
n∑
j=1









Where, for each hospital i in year t, tcit represents total costs (in thousands of euros)
and alosit the average length of stay (in days). X, Z and t are vectors. X is meas-
ured by inpatient episodes, outpatient visits, emergencies, outpatient services, day
surgeries and case-mix index; Z comprises inpatient episodes and case-mix index;
and t includes the time variables, representing the years 2004 to 2010. εit is the
error term. This estimation assumes that selection into the treatment is independ-
ent from the transitory idiosyncratic effect εit, and that the treatment and control
groups would have been subject the same time effects in the non-treatment scenario.
For both equations, there is an effect specific to each hospital (αi). The hospital
heterogeneity may be correlated with the dependent variables, but they may also be
independent of the regressors. In order to help decide whether to use a fixed effects
estimator—in the former situation—or a random effects estimator—in the latter
case—, a Hausman18 test was ran. According to this test, it is the fixed effects
estimator that should be used for both equations 4.1 and 4.2.




Computing differences of averages is one way of analysing the effects of a treatment
experiment, although it does not control for the hospital’s production or the passage
of time, nor does it consider the hospitals unobserved effects. First, for the treatment
group, the average of one variable19 is computed twice, for the periods before and
after the treatment. Then, the difference between the averages of the two periods
is calculated. The same method is repeated for the control group and, finally, the
average difference for the treatment group is subtracted from the control group’s.
Table 5.1.: Difference-in-Differences of log of total costs and average length of stay
LTC ALOS
Before (1) Control 11,360 7,410(2) Treat 11,909 6,724
After (3) Control 11,377 7,640(4) Treat 11,955 7,385
∆
(5) Control 0,017 0,230
(6) Treat 0,046 0,661
(7) ∆ 0,029 0,431
Notes: The items (1) through (4) represent, in the LTC case, average
logarithm of total costs, and in the ALOS case, average length of
stay.
For both variables, the items (5) and (6) represent the percentual dif-
ference between the after and before periods of each group, whereas
the item (7) represents the DiD over each of the variables.
The ∆ denotes the difference. The table was calculated in the fol-
lowing way: (5)=(3)-(1) | (6)=(4)-(2) | (7)=(6)-(5)
19 Such as total costs.
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5.1 Stylized facts
The difference of means in the case of the average length of stay is of 0,431 days—
approximately half a day—, the most substantial result. On the other hand, the
calculated average difference of the log of total cost’s observes an increase of 2,9%.
These results suggest that merging might have had an important increasing effect
over both the average length of stay, as it rose almost half a day, and the expenditure,
which rose close to 3%.
Regarding the treatment’s impact on the production variables, decreases were ob-
served for inpatient episodes, outpatient visits and emergencies. Contrariwise, out-
patient services and day surgeries registered a volume increase. The most significant
change happened for day surgeries, with an average difference of 19% more surgeries.
Table 5.2.: Difference-in-Differences of the production variables
IE OV OS DS EM
Before (1) Control 9,618 11,740 9,487 7,427 11,647
(2) Treat 10,180 12,478 10,044 7,717 12,140
After (3) Control 9,573 11,925 9,553 8,152 11,653
(4) Treat 10,120 12,609 10,170 8,632 12,057
∆ (5) Control -0,045 0,185 0,066 0,725 0,006
(6) Treat -0,060 0,131 0,126 0,915 -0,083
(7) ∆ -0,105 -0,054 0,060 0,190 -0,089
Notes: The variables exhibited in this table were transformed into
logarithms.
Items (1) through (4) respectively represent the average logarithm of
the following variables: Inpatient Episodes, Outpatient Visits, Out-
patient Services, Day Surgeries and Emergencies.
For all variables, the items (5) and (6) represent the percentual dif-
ference between the after and before periods of each group, whereas
the item (7) represents the DiD over each of the variables.
The ∆ denotes the difference. The table was calculated in the fol-
lowing way: (5)=(3)-(1) | (6)=(4)-(2) | (7)=(6)-(5)
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5.2 Analysis of the distribution
5.2. Analysis of the distribution
This section replicates the analysis of the previous section, this time separating the
data into five percentiles, focusing on what has happened on hospitals with different
cost dimensions and different efficiency levels. It should return some evidence on
what happened with the hospitals with the smallest and biggest expenditures, as well
as the hospitals with the shortest and longest average lengths of stay, for instance.
Table 5.3.: Difference-in-differences on the log of total costs, by percentiles
LTC 10 25 50 75 90
Before (1) Control 10,284 11,099 11,316 11,791 12,676(2) Treat 11,352 11,454 11,603 12,539 12,987
After (3) Control 10,312 10,552 11,416 11,835 12,097(4) Treat 11,155 11,442 11,780 12,519 12,921
∆
(5) Control 0,029 -0,547 0,100 0,044 -0,579
(6) Treat -0,197 -0,012 0,176 -0,019 -0,066
(7) ∆ -0,226 0,536 0,076 -0,063 0,513
Notes: The items (1) through (4) represent the average logarithm of
total costs, for different percentiles of expenditure.
For both variables, the items (5) and (6) represent the percentual dif-
ference between the after and before periods of each group, whereas
the item (7) represents the DiD over of the variable, along the differ-
ent cost percentiles.
The ∆ denotes the difference. The table was calculated in the fol-
lowing way: (5)=(3)-(1) | (6)=(4)-(2) | (7)=(6)-(5)
According to table 5.3, three percentiles have positive mean differences, 25, 50 and
90. Percentile 50, or the median, shows a shy difference, whereas the 25 and the 90
difference show more relevant results, respectively about 54% and 51%. Oppositely
, for percentiles 10 and 75 there is a negative difference of means, with the first
percentile assuming the biggest decrease in costs; the results are nearly -23% and
-6%, respectively.
The percentile average effect of the treatment for the average length of stay is
observed in Table 5.4. For all percentiles, except the 10, the effects are greater
than zero. Actually, as the percentiles increase, so do the average differences. It
appears that, the most efficient hospitals observed efficiency gains, as institutions in
the percentile 10 register an average length of stay decrease in 0,135 days. At the
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5.2 Analysis of the distribution
Table 5.4.: Difference-in-differences on the average length of stay, by percentiles
ALOS 10 25 50 75 90
Before (1) Control 5,940 6,560 7,405 8,200 9,100(2) Treat 5,400 5,850 6,655 7,700 8,240
After (3) Control 6,480 7,060 7,700 8,120 8,700(4) Treat 5,805 6,510 7,300 8,410 9,230
∆
(5) Control 0,540 0,500 0,295 -0,080 -0,400
(6) Treat 0,405 0,660 0,645 0,710 0,990
(7) ∆ -0,135 0,160 0,350 0,790 1,390
Notes: The items (1) through (4) represent the mean average length
of stay, for different percentiles of expenditure.
For both variables, the items (5) and (6) represent the percentual dif-
ference between the after and before periods of each group, whereas
the item (7) represents the DiD over of the variable, along the differ-
ent cost percentiles.
The ∆ denotes the difference. The table was calculated in the fol-
lowing way: (5)=(3)-(1) | (6)=(4)-(2) | (7)=(6)-(5)
same time, it seems that, the more inefficient hospitals are, the more their efficiency
fell with the treatment. Hospitals in percentile 75 show a difference of 0,790 days,





The results of the econometric analysis of equation 4.1 are shown in table 5.5.
The merger effect is measured by the aftertreat variable, which lacks statistical
significance. Its coefficient is very close to zero, which, together with a large p-value,
means that there is evidence that the mergers produced no changes in the financial
performance of the hospitals. The epe variable is significant with a coefficient of
-0,04. This suggests that the adoption of the enterprise management model was a
success, contributing to a cost decrease of 4%, on average.
The production variables return the expected results, with the exception of inpatient
episodes and the case-mix index, whose signals are negative. There is no obvious
explanation for the signal of inpatient episodes’ coefficient, especially given its very
large p-value. Still, one possible explanation for the case-mix index’s coefficient sign
might be that, hospitals more exposed to complex medical situations, which bring
higher costs, feel a greater need for controlling their expenditure, becoming this way
economically more efficient. Of the seven year variables, only four have statistically
significant coefficients, going from a 5,4% average cost increase in 2005, to a 6,2%
average rise in 2010.
Table 5.6 displays the output of equation 4.2. The aftertreat variable has statist-
ical significance, with a positive coefficient of 0,348. This is evidence the treatment
induced an increase in the hospitals’ average lengths of stay, in one third of a day—
approximately eight hours. The regressor epe shows a statistically significant coeffi-
cient of -0,511, suggesting a positive effect of the new management model, reducing
the hospitals’ average length of stay in half a day, on average.
None of the production variables comes off statistically significant. These coefficients
reveal the expected signs, as the number of inpatient episodes and the case-mix
index are both likely to increase the length of hospitalizations. In addition, the year
variables’ coefficients are not statistically significant, meaning that the analysed
hospitals have not benefited from efficiency gains over time.
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5.3 Regression results
Table 5.5.: Equation 4.1 — Treatment effect over the log of total costs




log(inpatient episodes) -0,195 0,921
log(outpatient visits) 1,768 0,175
log(emergencies) 1,747 0,253
log(outpatient services) 0,024 0,932
log(day surgeries) 0,383 0,128
case-mix -3,239 0,090**
log(in. episodes) 2 0,100 0,452
log(out. visits) 2 0,080 0,028*
log(emergencies) 2 0,052 0,421
log(out. services) 2 -0,011 0,034*
log(day surgeries) 2 0,009 0,181
case-mix 2 0,050 0,787
log(in. episodes)*log(out. visits) -0,200 0,289
log(in. episodes)*log(out. services) 0,158 0,010*
log(in. episodes)*log(emergencies) -0,115 0,547
log(in. episodes)*log(day surgeries) 0,032 0,528
log(in. episodes)*case-mix 0,293 0,149
log(out. visits)*log(out. services) -0,043 0,312
log(out. visits)*log(emergencies) -0,074 0,722
log(out. visits)*log(day surgeries) -0,030 0,381
log(emergencies)*log(out. services) -0,066 0,012*
log(emergencies)*log(day surgeries) -0,032 0,377

















Notes: Fixed effects regression estimation (unobserved and observed
permanent characteristics).
Since the fixed effects estimator controls for time-invariant effects,
the treat variable cannot be estimated.
In. episodes stands for inpatient episodes, out. means outpatient.
* Coefficient significant at a 5% significance level .
** Coefficient significant at a 10% significance level.
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5.3 Regression results
Table 5.6.: Equation 4.2 — Treatment effect over the average length of stay




log(inpatient episodes) 1,499 0,429
log(in. episodes) 2 -0,130 0,422
case-mix 6,832 0,423
case-mix 2 -1,620 0,278

















Notes: Fixed effects regression estimation (unobserved and observed
permanent characteristics).
Since the fixed effects estimator controls for time-invariant effects, the
treat variable cannot be estimated.In. episodes stands for inpatient
episodes.
In. episodes stands for inpatient episodes.
* Coefficient significant at a 5% significance level .
** Coefficient significant at a 10% significance level.
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6. Robustness
6.1. Use of 2011
In the present section, the issue of the lack of data for ten hospitals in 2011 is ana-
lysed. Either this happened because some hospitals had not yet released their annual
reports, or their data for the year was removed due to the design of the treatment
group (see section 2.2.1). Amongst these hospitals without data for 2011, there are
four institutions with very large expenditures20: Centro Hospitalar Lisboa Norte,
Centro Hospitalar do Porto, Hospital de São João and Hospitais da Universidade
de Coimbra. The first two hospitals belong to the treatment group, while the two
last are included in the control group.
The absence of data for some of the hospitals with the largest expenditures may
influence the results. In order to establish whether this year should be maintained
in the data set, the models were ran excluding the data for 2011. This analysis
generated similar econometric outputs, with the results pointing in the same direc-
tion as those presented in chapter 5. In spite of slight coefficient changes, and some
interaction effects gaining and losing significance, removing the year 2011 did not
yield different results. For equation 4.1, the variables after, aftertreat still did not
have statistical significance, where the epe maintained it. As for equation 4.2, the
variable after was again deemed not significant, and the aftertreat and epe dummies
kept the statistical significance.
6.2. Quantile regression
Although equation 4.2 identified an effect of the treatment, equation 4.1 did not.
Was this caused by the actual inexistance of such effect, or because the mergers




differently impacted hospitals with small or big expenditures?
In order to find an answer, a quantile regression of equation 4.1 was ran. It measures
the treatment effect according to the dimension of the hospital’s costs, allowing to
see if there was a merger effect in the hospitals with small—or the smallest—costs, or
in the hospitals with large—or the largest—costs. Additionally, a quantile regression
of equation 4.2 was also done, allowing to see if hospitals with short, or the shortest
lengths of stay, were impacted differently by the mergers, as well as hospitals with
long, or the longest lengths of stay.
Table 6.1.: Quantile regression
The examined percentiles are 10, 25, 50, 75 and 90. The quantile regressions include
the same dependent and explanatory variables as equations 4.1 and 4.2, and are as
follows:
Qltc (p | X) = X ′itqβitq (p) (6.1)
Qalos (p | Z) = Z ′itqβitq (p) (6.2)
p = (10, 25, 50, 75, 90)
Where p ε (0, 1) and represents the pth percentile of the respective dependent vari-
able. X is measured by inpatient episodes, outpatient visits, emergencies, outpatient
services, day surgeries and case-mix index, and Z by inpatient episodes and case-mix
index.
The quantile regression of equation 4.1 did not yield different results from the fixed
effects estimator, which is evidence of the treatment not producing different effects,
regardless of the cost dimension of the hospitals. As for the quantile regression for
equation 4.2, the aftertreat regressor of the percentile 75 was statistically significant,
with a coefficient of 0,832. This means that, on average, hospitals with the 75%
largest average lengths of stay observed an increase in this indicator of about 0,8
days—approximately 19 hours. These results reveal that the effect captured by
equation 4.2 was mainly boosted by these less efficient hospitals—with higher lenghts
of stay—, whose efficiency decreased even further.
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7. Conclusions
This thesis proposed to evaluate the consequences of mergers between public hos-
pitals in Portugal. A central objective of the mergers was reducing the expenditure
of the hospitals, therefore the impact of merging on the institutions’ financial per-
formance was studied. The analysis did not identify any effect of the mergers on
this indicator, which is evidence that, as a result from the management changes,
neither did the hospitals’ costs increase, nor did they decrease.
Secondly, the objective was to analyse if the hospital mergers caused the hospitals’
efficiency to increase or to decrease, or even to stay constant despite the changes.
The evidence points to an efficiency decrease, particularly caused by the hospitals
that were mostly inefficient to begin with, which suffered a further increase in the
average lengths of stay. The increases in the lengths of stay happen due to a decrease
in the capacity of the hospitals of working in a way that allows patients to be
discharged faster—medical integrity is assumed, meaning that patients are assumed
to be discharged only when healed.
Accordingly, the central result of this study is that hospital mergers are yet to
produce significant gains, namely on the financial performance in the institutions,
which is the state’s priority. Nonetheless, mergers between hospitals can still be
valuable and there are some policies that can be implemented in order to enhance
the consolidations, such as the ones that follow. First of all, there should be back
office concentration. In other words, merged hospitals should share administrative
services, such as, accounting, IT and human resources, as well as legal, which will
allow greater economies of scale and better management efficiency. In the same fash-
ion, the top management of these institutions should be as consolidated as possible,
in order to produce savings and, at the same time, promote better overseeing and
control. Furthermore, hospital business plans should be drawn with the comple-
mentarity of the different institutions in mind, as a way to reduce redundancies in
administrative and medical services, and use technical, as well as human resources
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Conclusions
in a more efficient manner. Correspondingly, personnel mobility and sharing across
institutions of the same hospital, according to the needs and the demand for health





Table A.1.: Detailed output of equation 4.1
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Appendix
Table A.2.: Detailed output of equation 4.2
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Table A.3.: Hausman test for equation 4.1
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Table A.4.: Hausman test for equation 4.2
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Table A.5.: Difference-in-differences for the treatment group’s hospitals



















































Table A.6.: Difference-in-differences for the control group’s hospitals
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Appendix
Table A.7.: Difference-in-differences for the control group’s hospitals (continua-
tion)













Table A.8.: Merger dates of the treatment group’s hospitals
Hospital Year
CH Alto Ave 2007
CH Barreiro-Montijo 2010
CH Entre Douro E Vouga 2009
CH Gaia-Espinho 2007
CH Lisboa Norte 2008
CH Lisboa Central 2007
CH Lisboa Ocidental 2006




CH Trás-os-Montes/Alto Douro 2007
Notes: This table expresses the dates according to the
method expressed in section 2.2.3. Therefore, the displayed
years represent the first year each of the hospitals is in the
after period, in other words, the first year of the institution
as a merged hospital.
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Table A.9.: Composition of the merged hospitals, as used in the sample
Merged hospital Composition of the merged hospital
CH Entre o Douro e Vouga
H São Sebastião
H São João da Madeira
H São Miguel
CH Médio Ave H Conde de São BentoH São João de Deus
CH Lisboa Central
H São José






H Pediátrico Maria Pia
CH Barreiro Montijo H Distrital do MontijoH Nossa Senhora do Rosário
CH Setúbal H Ortopédico Sant’Iago do OutãoH São Bernardo
CH Vila Nova de Gaia/Espinho
H Eduardo Santos Silva
H Distrital Vila Nova de Gaia
H Nossa Senhora da Ajuda
CH Lisboa Ocidental
H Egas Moniz
H São Francisco Xavier
H Santa Cruz
CH Tâmega e Sousa H Padre AméricoH de Amarante
CH Lisboa Norte H Santa MariaH Pulido Valente
CH Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro
H Dom Luiz I
H São Pedro de Vila Real
H Chaves
H Lamego




Table A.10.: Correlation between the variables of the data set
treat after aftertreat epe ltc alos lie locv lem los lds cmi
treat 1.0000
after -0.0889 1.0000
aftertreat 0.6470 0.4563 1.0000
epe -0.1486 0.4083 0.2699 1.0000
ltc 0.3350 0.0066 0.2663 0.0299 1.0000
alos -0.2341 0.2853 0.0233 -0.0259 0.4065 1.0000
lie 0.4239 -0.1386 0.2631 0.0333 0.8716 0.0765 1.0000
lov 0.4944 0.0643 0.3849 0.0844 0.8660 0.1280 0.8409 1.0000
lem 0.4942 -0.1213 0.2831 0.0456 0.6484 -0.0540 0.7951 0.6855 1.0000
los 0.2852 0.0033 0.2286 0.0295 0.7359 0.3350 0.6737 0.6761 0.5500 1.0000
lds 0.1725 0.4282 0.3724 0.3059 0.4677 0.0412 0.4065 0.5801 0.3605 0.3237 1.0000
cmi 0.0019 0.2722 0.1453 -0.0749 0.5626 0.6624 0.2470 0.4424 0.1065 0.3387 0.3401 1.0000
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